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Abstract 
This paper examines the formation and stability of coalitions in international climate 
agreements with a combined game-theoretic and integrated assessment model. The empirical 
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cartel game. We argue that a dynamic transfer scheme, based on a full path of emissions over 
the planning horizon, can overcome some of the major obstacles in international negotiations 
by incorporating the expected growth of emissions in developing countries in the distribution 
of emission permits. The simulation results show that permit trading based on grandfathering 
permits proportionate to a static base year level of emissions may lead to counter-intuitive 
transfer flows, and no stable coalitions emerge. This is resolved under a dynamic transfer 
scheme: we then find two small stable coalitions: a coalition between the European Union 
(EU15) and China, or a coalition between Japan and India. 
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 1. Introduction 
Global warming problems entail externalities that extend beyond national borders. Each 
region’s payoff and welfare derived from emission reduction (abatement) depends heavily on 
the arrangements enacted by international environmental agreements (IEAs) and the design of 
institutions. It remains a crucial research topic how such a voluntary agreement could be 
implemented and what incentives regions have to participate in an agreement. The difficulties 
with which the Kyoto protocol came into force in February 2005, but without ratification by 
the U.S.A., illustrate the importance of this topic. 
Studies by Hoel (1992 and 1994), Barrett (1994), Fankhauser and Kverndokk (1996), Hoel 
and Schneider (1997), Peck and Teisberg (1999), Finus et al. (2004 and 2005) and others have 
proposed different settings to increase the environmental effectiveness and to stimulate 
voluntary initiatives to cooperate on IEAs. Some of the policy regimes apply the concept of 
transfer schemes between countries, such as emission permit trading or surplus sharing (e.g., 
Edmonds et al., 1995; Rose et al., 1998; Altamirano-Cabrera and Finus, 2006; and Weikard et 
al., 2006). Transfer schemes are especially suitable to compensate regions that contribute 
relatively much to abatement in the coalition, but that have relatively low benefits from 
abatement. 
So far, little work has been done on the interaction between coalition formation and the 
optimal abatement paths, and on testing the stability of partial coalitions in a game theoretical 
approach with empirical inputs. In the framework of a non-cooperative game, Tol (2001) 
tested stability for all possible coalitions with and without side payment (transfer) using an 
integrated assessment model of climate change (FUND) including nine regions. FUND 
applies a fixed path of abatement instead of deriving the optimal abatement in each period. It 
turns out that the Grand Coalition is not stable under the side payment, and the largest 
emitters or the most affected regions are excluded in the largest stable coalition. 
In the framework of a cooperative game with a dynamic, multi-regional integrated assessment 
model, Eyckmans and Tulkens (2003) calculated the optimal path of abatement and 
aggregated discounted welfare for each region. They apply the transfer scheme advocated by 
Germain et al. (1998) for the CLIMNEG world simulation (CWS) model with six regions. In 
CWS, the idea of surplus sharing is used for determining the transfer scheme, and they 
compute all possible partial agreement Nash equilibria (64 possible coalitions). They found 
that allocation in the full cooperation lies in the core of the emission abatement game 
under this specific transfer scheme. 
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 In all these studies, the transfer schemes are based on a single year for assigning the permits 
or shares in the surplus. Such static transfer schemes are also often observed in reality, e.g. the 
reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocol are designed as reduction compared to 1990 levels. 
These static schemes, however, do not take into account that the future growth paths of 
emissions are expected to diverge substantially between regions. This leads to assignments 
where historically large emitters obtain relatively large shares of the permits / surplus, while 
fast-growing developing countries, such as China or India, obtain relatively small shares. This 
leads to increasing burdens on these developing countries to reduce theirs’ emissions; a notion 
brought forward by many developing countries in their argumentation on why they do not 
agree on any reduction targets in the Kyoto protocol. Dynamic transfer schemes, that are 
based on expected paths of emissions1, can overcome these obstacles and can therefore 
contribute to the stability of international climate agreements. Similarly, dynamic transfer 
schemes can be constructed that are based on other allocation rules, such as regional 
population trends. 
It is clear that in practice, it will be hard to find a reference path of emissions for the coming 
decades that is acceptable for all parties. This topic is explored in detail in Böhringer and 
Lange (2005), who find that dynamic grandfathering schemes may be efficient. Moreover, 
there may be scope for strategic behavior by countries in the estimation of their future 
emissions. Nonetheless, expected emission paths are commonly used, for instance by 
Nakicenovic et al. (2000) and Carter et al. (2001). To use dynamic paths will not be easy in 
the international negotiations. To avoid strategic behavior as much as possible, it is necessary 
to very carefully check the reference emission paths as the basis for the dynamic transfer 
scheme. If the incentives for countries to cooperate increase with such dynamic transfer paths, 
countries may compromise on accepting the relevant reference emission paths. 
The purpose of this paper is to test stability of climate coalitions in a non-cooperative, one-
shot cartel game for twelve world regions by optimizing abatement paths under different 
transfer schemes, and to analyze the impact of implementing dynamic transfer paths on the 
stability of coalitions in an empirical setting. To this end, we have constructed a model for the 
stability of coalitions, STACO-2.1, that is capable of identifying the regional optimal 
abatement paths based on the stream of benefits and costs of abatement. The model is an 
update and dynamic extension of the STACO-1 model as described in Finus et al. (2005). As 
                                                 
1 Such reference emission paths are constructed assuming no implementation of (additional) climate policy. They 
are often refered to as Baseline Business-as-Usual projections. 
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 each region’s strategy depends on its abatement costs and benefits (avoided damages) in each 
period, each region can simultaneously decide which amount of CO2 emission should be 
reduced and when. We assume that undiscounted benefits in each period depends not only on 
current abatement but also on abatement in previous periods through reduced concentrations 
of CO2 and correspondingly lower damage levels. Our model incorporates several transfer 
schemes, based on different allocation rules. The model calculates related economic variables 
such as benefits, abatement cost and payoffs (expressed year by year) and the discounted 
aggregates.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the game theoretical and empirical 
framework of the STACO-2.1 model. Section 3 reports main results without emission permits 
and examines the findings with static and dynamic permit systems. In section 4, we 
investigate alternative transfer schemes. Section 5 concludes. The Appendix provides the 
parameters in our model. 
2. The stability of coalitions model (STACO-2.1) 
2.1. Game theoretic background 
We consider a two-stage, non-cooperative game of coalition formation. Countries or regions 
(hereinafter referred to as regions) are denoted by Ni ,...,1= . At the first stage, regions decide 
to join a coalition or not (membership of the coalition), and then a coalition is formed. 
Regions announcing not to join a coalition become a singleton, and those announcing to join 
the coalition become signatories of a cartel coalition. In our model, which comprises twelve 
regions, we can obtain 4084 ( -12) different coalition structures.  122
In the second stage, regions adopt their abatement strategies over the planning horizon 
=1,…,t T . The game at the second stage is a difference game. The strategies are based on the 
following payoff function ( ): π
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where the model horizon to account for future benefits is infinity, r is the discount rate on the 
payoff, q  is an abatement matrix of dimension N × T . 2  is a concave benefit function of itb
                                                 
2 We adopt the common notation where subscripts are dropped to denote aggregation over that index. 
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 past and current global abatement in period t, and  is a convex abatement cost function of 
regional current abatement. Benefit function and abatement cost function are specified in 
detail in Section 2.2. We calculate the optimal abatement paths over planning horizon, t = 
1,…,
itc
T . The abatement strategy space for each region is defined as [ ]itit eq ,0∈ , where 
ite denotes regional emission levels in the business-as-usual scenario with no abatement. Note 
that benefits for each region depend on aggregated global emission reductions and that 
abatement costs depend on the emission reduction by region. 
Following Bloch (1997), we assume that signatories and singletons play a Nash equilibrium 
with regard to their abatement strategies, which is also called a partial agreement Nash 
equilibrium between signatories and singletons (Chander and Tulkens, 1995 and 1997). Non-
signatories choose their abatement level by maximizing their own payoffs, taking the other 
regions’ abatement levels as given. Signatories choose the abatement levels that maximize the 
sum of the payoffs of the signatories, taking the abatement levels of non-signatories as given. 
We call a coalition where none or one of the regions joins the coalition ‘All Singletons’, and a 
coalition where all regions cooperate ‘Grand Coalition’. In the Grand Coalition, the highest 
global abatement levels and payoffs are obtained, as all spillovers from abatement on the 
benefits of other regions are taken into account.  
Internal stability of a coalition means that no signatory has an incentive to withdraw from the 
coalition as a lower payoff is obtained by changing the strategy to not join the coalition. 
Similarly, external stability of a coalition means an equilibrium where no non-signatories 
have an incentive to participate in the coalition as a lower payoff is achieved by changing 
their strategy to join a coalition. We call a coalition structure K stable, if the coalition satisfies 
both internal and external stability. In the definition of external stability, it is implicitly 
assumed that non-signatories can join the coalition freely whenever they can obtain the higher 
payoff by joining the coalition, without the approval by other signatories. We call this 
‘stability under open membership’ (cf. Finus et al., 2004). In this paper, we apply this concept 
of open membership, mainly because it seems in line with the procedures of the Kyoto 
protocol.  
2.2. Empirical background – STACO-2.1 model with multi-periods in one-shot game 
In this section, we explain the empirical module of our model which we label STACO-2.1 
(Box 1). The model is an update and extension of the original STACO-1 model, described in 
Dellink et al. (2004) and Finus et al. (2005). Here, we focus on the main features of the model 
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 and on the differences with STACO-1. We consider twelve world regions; USA (USA), Japan 
(JPN), European Union - 15 (EU15), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European 
countries (EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), China 
(CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and rest of the world 
(ROW). We set the model horizon to account for benefits from abatement to infinity, but 
adopt a shorter planning horizon of 100 years, ranging from 2011 to 2110, for determining 
abatement levels. Together, this ensures a proper reflection of the intertemporal aspects of 
climate change, while the period for which the international agreement holds is limited. 
Essentially, in 2010 the signatories strike an agreement that sets their abatement path until 
2110, while taking into account all future benefits and costs from that abatement path. 
We calibrate the payoff function for each region expressed in equation [1]. Payoff for region 
 in  period, , depends on the abatement path until . Benefit, , from abatement is the 
function of avoided damages which is derived from the damage module of the DICE model 
(Nordhaus, 1994) and the climate module by Germain and Van Steenberghe (2003). For CO
i t itπ t itb
2 
concentrations, the model bases its calibration on DICE model developed by Nordhaus 
(1994). In contrast to STACO-1, we use the data for CO2 emission derived from EPPA model 
(Reilly, 2005) to calibrate the regional BAU emission paths3 in our model; these paths are 
represented in Appendix 2. The damage function is a function of the stock of CO2 and can be 
approximated by a linear function. In equation [3],  denotes global GDP in year  as given 
in Nordhaus (1994), and  and  are estimated by OLS-regression (Dellink et al., 2004). 
For the global damage parameter , we apply the estimate by Tol (1997) that damages 
amount to 2.7 percent of GDP for a doubling of concentrations over pre-industrial levels, that 
is, = 0.027. Global benefits are allocated according to the share for each region, as 
displayed in Appendix 2.  
ty t
1γ 2γ
Dγ
Dγ iθ
We specify an abatement cost function following the estimates of the EPPA model by 
Ellerman and Decaux (1998). In our model, we assume exogenous technological progress for 
0.5 percent annually that is modelled as a reduction of current abatement costs. STACO-1 
assumed that each region chooses a constant abatement level over planning time horizon. 
Here, we use a specification in which abatement levels for each period are endogenously 
determined in the model by maximizing the net present value of the stream of payoffs. Each 
region has perfect foresight of the future and can plan its abatement path for the current and 
                                                 
3 We use data from World Bank (2003) to match the regional aggregation in EPPA to STACO. 
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 all future years within the planning period. Finally, we implement a transversality condition 
for the future impacts from abatement by assuming that marginal global benefits reflect all 
current and future benefits from abatement in period t , discounted back to period . t
Box 1. Equations in STACO-2.1 
Payoff function (objective function) 
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 2.3. Transfer schemes 
We incorporate an emission permit trading system in the model to allow for transfers among 
regions in the coalition. Following the permits trading scheme of Altamirano-Cabrera and 
Finus (2006) who apply several allocation-based rules4 for distributing the permits, we focus 
on the pragmatic scheme which distributes permits in proportion to emissions. This allocation 
scheme is presented in the Kyoto protocol as ‘Grandfathering’ where the allocation of permits 
is based on the historical emission for each region. Emission permits can be traded only 
among signatories, so after trade payoffs ( ) for signatories are calculated as Kitπˆ
 ))(~())((ππˆ ** KqqpKq ititttKitKit −⋅−=  , [13] 
where  is the permit price at t period and  is the assigned abatement for i  player at 
period  under the permit trading system in a coalition structure
tp itq~
t K . The first term on the right 
hand side of equation [13] is the payoff from the optimal abatement level , without trading 
permits. The second term implies that if a region reduces emission more than assigned 
(
*
itq
*~
itit qq < ), the region can sell the permits to other signatories. On the other hand, if a region 
reduces emissions less than the assigned abatement level ( *~ itit qq > ), the region has to 
compensate the difference by purchasing permits. The price of a permit, , equals marginal 
abatement costs.  
tp
In the permits market, the emission permits of region i at period t, , are calculated as a 
share 
ite~
itλ  of the total amount of permits among signatories K with 1it
i K
λ
∈
=∑ , such that 
 , [14] it it it
i K
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where K denotes the set of signatories. 
As the total amount of emission permits for signatories is equal to the emission level in 
equilibrium, ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
=
Ki Ki
iit ee
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Ki Ki
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4 For criteria of rules for allocating permits see Edmonds et al. (1995) and Rose et al. (1998). 
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 For the static transfer scheme, share itλ  is calculated based on the ratio of 2010 emissions for 
region  (i 2010,ie ) over the total 2010 emissions of all signatories. Thus, the share is constant 
over time: 
 ∑
∈
==
Ki
i
i
iit e
e
2010,
2010,λλ  . [16a]  
For the dynamic transfer scheme, we use the full path of reference emissions without 
abatement to determine the time-dependent shares: 
 ∑
∈
=
Ki
it
it
it e
eλ  . [16b] 
3. Results  
We start this section with an examination of the case without permit trading in Section 3.1. 
This case can serve as a reference point for the analysis of the various transfer schemes in the 
following sections. Section 3.2 presents results for emission-based permit trading, while 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 discuss the alternative transfer schemes of population-based permit 
trading and emission-based surplus sharing, respectively. 
3.1. Coalition formation without emission permits 
Table 1 shows the results of the non-cooperative case for reducing emissions where all 
players act as singletons. In this All Singletons structure, marginal abatement costs equal 
marginal benefits for each region. The results for this case give good insights into the 
incentive structure of the different regions. The percentage of annual abatement compared to 
BAU emission tends to be decreasing over time and leads to a stock of CO2 of 1,448 Gton by 
the year 2110. This is about 1.7 times the stock level in 2010.  
At the individual region level, abatement differs from region to region, as the abatement level 
is determined by marginal benefits and marginal costs. The USA, a region with a low 
marginal abatement cost curve, and high share of global benefits (cf. Appendix 2), has an 
incentive to make substantial abatement efforts even in the All Singletons case, and in 2011 
USA reduces 9.9 percent of BAU emissions. Regions with higher marginal abatement cost 
and lower share of global benefits, such as energy exporting countries, Brazil, and dynamic 
Asian economies, have hardly any incentive to reduce emission on their own. Japan, which 
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 has a relatively high share of global benefits, does not make much abatement efforts due to 
higher marginal cost. In 2011, it only reduces about 2.5 percent of emissions in the BAU case 
and total abatement amounts to 2 Gton over time. 
Table 1: All Singletons Structure 
Annual abatement 
(% of BAU 
emissions) 
Net present value (NPV) of 
payoff 
Marginal 
costs in 2011 
Marginal benefits 
from abatement in 
2011 Regions 
2011 2110 Billion US$ over 100 years US$/ton US$/ton 
USA 9.9 5.5 1,117 22.4 22.4 
JPN 2.5 3.0 943 17.1 17.1 
EU15 7.6 5.6 1,240 23.4 23.4 
OOE 5.6 2.6 188 3.4 3.4 
EET 4.4 2.9 71 1.3 1.3 
FSU 6.7 5.3 362 6.7 6.7 
EEX 1.9 2.0 164 3.0 3.0 
CHN 14.8 10.8 298 6.1 6.1 
IND 10.5 5.3 268 4.9 4.9 
DAE 1.9 2.1 136 2.5 2.5 
BRA 0.1 0.2 84 1.5 1.5 
ROW 6.3 4.5 365 6.7 6.7 
Global 8.0 5.5 5,238   
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,448 Gton 
Figure 1 depicts the global emission paths over time horizon for respectively the BAU case, 
All Singletons and Grand Coalition. 
Figure 1: Global emission paths for BAU, All Singletons, and Grand Coalition (without 
transfers) 
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 In the BAU scenario, no abatement takes place. BAU emissions grow in the form of an S-
shaped curve, and the pace of growth slows down at the end of the century, reaching a level of 
almost 25 Gton by 2110. In the case of All Singletons, emissions reach about 24 Gton by 
2110. Emissions in the Grand Coalition are about 20 percent lower than in the All Singletons 
case, and reach around 19 Gton by 2110. 
We compute all possible cartel coalitions and examine stability for all 4084 coalition 
structures with an algorithm programmed in Matlab. Without permits, 14 non-trivial 
coalitions are internally stable, of which only the one between Japan & EU15 is also 
externally stable. Table 2 shows the results for stable coalition, Japan & EU15. EU15 reduces 
emissions about 30 percent more than in the All Singletons structure. Japan makes abatement 
efforts twice as high as in the All Singletons structure. As a result of their cooperation, both 
regions can obtain slightly higher net present payoff than in the All Singletons case.  
Table 2: Coalition of Japan and EU15 (without transfers) 
Annual abatement 
(% of BAU 
emissions) 
Net present value (NPV) 
of payoff 
Marginal costs in 
2011 
Incentive to change 
membership (NPV) 
Regions 
2011 2110 Billion US$ over 100 years US$/ton 
Billion US$ over 100 
years 
USA 10 6 1,199 22.4 -143 
JPN 6 6 975 40.4 -32 
EU15 11 8 1,244 40.4 -4 
OOE 6 3 201 3.4 -70 
EET 4 3 76 1.3 -78 
FSU 7 5 386 6.7 -121 
EEX 2 2 175 3.0 -107 
CHN 15 11 321 6.1 -725 
IND 10 5 286 4.9 -159 
DAE 2 2 145 2.5 -89 
BRA 0 0 90 1.5 -7 
ROW 6 5 389 6.7 -126 
Global 8.6 5.8 5,486   
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,445 Gton 
Incentive to leave the coalition is shown in the last column of Table 2 and is calculated as the 
difference between the net present value of regional payoff when the region leaves the 
coalition and net present value of regional payoff for the coalition including the region. 
Similarly, for singletons the incentive to join the coalition is calculated and represented in 
Table 2. Both coalition members have interest in cooperation, because of their higher 
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 marginal benefits from abatement, while none of the other regions want to join, as their 
abatement costs would increase too much if they have to take the benefits in Japan and EU15 
into account.  
Other coalitions are not stable, implying that free-rider incentives are strong and regions are 
often better off when they stay outside a coalition.  
3.2. Emission-based permit trading 
3.2.1. A static transfer scheme 
In this section, we incorporate a transfer scheme based on emission permit trading across 
regions in the coalition, as explained in Section 2.3. In the static transfer scheme, emission 
permits are divided over the coalition members based on their respective emissions in the base 
year 2010.5 Table 3 shows the results of the Grand Coalition without and with a static 
emission-based permit trading scheme.  
Table 3: Grand Coalition (with emission-based permit trading) 
Abatement in 2110 Net present value (NPV) of payoff 
Incentive to change 
membership (NPV) 
(% of BAU emissions) Billion US$ over 100 years Billion US$ over 100 yearsRegions 
efficient 
level 
assigned level 
for static 
transfers 
no  
transfers 
static 
transfers 
no  
transfers 
static 
transfers 
USA 12 31  4,158 2,090 52 2,120 
JPN 11 3  3,930 4,011 -281 -362 
EU15 12 15  5,062 4,724 -432 -94 
OOE 14 38  518 -325 261 1,103 
EET 29 20  -1 187 297 109 
FSU 21 -5  1,031 1,721 423 -268 
EEX 21 14  248 395 420 274 
CHN 54 25  -1,777 1,255 2,727 -305 
IND 29 45  482 -217 588 1,287 
DAE 26 11  209 454 352 107 
BRA 5 21  333 -16 27 376 
ROW 20 18  1,019 932 442 530 
Global 23 23  15,211 15,211 4,877 4,877 
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,304 Gton 
                                                 
5 Using 1990 emission levels instead of 2010 does not influence the main qualitative results (results available 
from the authors upon request). 
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 In the Grand Coalition, total gain of cooperation in terms of the net present value of payoff 
compared to the All Singletons case is 9,973 billion US$. Even though at the global level, 
substantially higher net present value of payoff can be achieved, some regions are worse off 
when the Grand Coalition is formed. For instance, China, which has the lowest abatement 
costs, has to contribute much to reduce emissions. This leads to the large difference in the net 
present value of payoff, from 298 billion US $ in the All Singletons case to -1,777 billion US 
$ in the Grand Coalition without transfers.  
At the global level, transfers such as the emission permit trading scheme do not affect payoff, 
but the allocation of payoff over regions is changed. With regard to the net present value of 
transfers, a positive number implies that the region pays a transfer (is a permit buyer), and a 
negative number means that the region receives a transfer (is a permit seller). Japan, Eastern 
European countries, Former Soviet Union, Energy exporting countries, China and dynamic 
Asian economies become permit sellers and the other regions become permit buyers. The 
incentive to leave the coalition increases for permit buyers and reduces for permit sellers. 
Thus, if the permit buyers are those regions that have a high stake in collaboration, i.e. they 
have high marginal benefits, tradable permits may stabilize the coalition. In the Grand 
Coalition, permits can solve the problem of the high reduction burden for China, but the 
coalition is not stable, as most regions still have an incentive to leave the coalition. 
The coalition between Japan and European Union is no longer stable under the transfer 
scheme. The European Union no longer desires to stay in this coalition, as it would have to 
pay more for buying permits from Japan than its gain from collaboration provides. A more 
likely coalition for stability is a combination of a region with high marginal benefits, such as 
Japan or European Union, together with a region with low marginal abatement costs, such as 
China or India. The basic idea is that the former regions could finance emission reductions in 
the latter regions. However, under a static emission-based permit trading scheme, the number 
of permits issues to China and India is relatively small, and their reference emissions grow 
relatively fast, and hence these regions need large abatement efforts to reach their targets. In 
contrast, a region like Japan will, relatively speaking, obtain many permits under a static 
scheme, whereas their emissions are expected to hardly grow over the century. 
As the reduction target for the coalition of, for instance, Japan and India is limited to a rather 
low level, Japan will actually have excess permits to sell in the later decades. India will 
demand these permits to be able to attain their target. Thus, India is not compensated by Japan 
for carrying out the relatively large share of coalitional abatement, but rather punished for 
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 growing fast. Clearly, the coalition is not beneficial for India and it is not surprising that this 
coalition is unstable. 
3.2.2. A dynamic transfer scheme 
A possible way out of this dilemma is to base the distribution of emission permits on the 
whole path of reference emissions. This will overcome the counter-intuitive situation obtained 
in the static transfer scheme, as fast-growing regions such as India will obtain more permits 
over time. Thus, dynamic transfer schemes are much better aligned with the changing 
incentive structures of regions over time and may be a key determinant in persuading 
developing countries to sign an international climate agreement. 
Table 4: Stable coalitions (with dynamic emission-based permit trading) 
Efficient abatement in 2110 Net present value (NPV) of payoff 
Incentive to change 
membership (NPV) 
(% of BAU emissions) Billion US$ over 100 years Billion US$ over 100 yearsRegions 
(a)  
EU15 & 
China 
(b)  
Japan &  
India  
(a)  
EU15 & 
China 
(b)  
Japan & 
India 
(a)  
EU15 &  
China 
(b)  
Japan & 
India 
USA 6 6  1,780 1,240 -654 -126 
JPN 3 4  1,448 975 -23 -32 
EU15 6 6  1,512 1,368 -272 -71 
OOE 3 3  289 207 -176 -44 
EET 3 3  109 78 -63 -7 
FSU 5 5  559 398 -251 -52 
EEX 2 2  252 180 -197 -56 
CHN 28 11  401 332 -103 -13 
IND 5 13  415 287 -105 -18 
DAE 2 2  209 150 -123 -33 
BRA 0 0  129 93 -84 -31 
ROW 5 5  564 402 -235 -52 
Global 8 6  7,667 5,709 -2,284 -536 
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,425 Gton (EU15 – China) and 1,444 Gton (Japan and India) 
Under the dynamic tradable emission permit scheme, twelve coalitions are internally stable of 
which two are also externally stable. Table 4 displays the results of the two stable coalitions; 
(a) EU15 & China, and (b) Japan & India. In the case without permits, China and India have 
incentive to leave the coalition because of higher abatement burden compared to EU15 and 
Japan respectively, and they have lower payoffs. This makes the coalition internally unstable. 
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 Under the dynamic transfer scheme, these situations are improved. China and India 
respectively have lower assigned abatement (more emission permits), and they can sell their 
permits to each partner, EU15 and Japan, respectively. China can obtain transfers from EU15 
amounting to a Net Present Value (NPV) of about 392 billion US $, and India from Japan 
amounting to an NPV of about 57 billion US $. These transfers would encourage China and 
India to make a coalition with respectively EU15 and Japan, and not to leave the coalition.  
Figure 2: Annual abatement (percent of emission in BAU) for stable coalitions 
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 The panels (a) and (b) in Figure 2 clearly show that signatories will undertake a substantial 
part of global abatement, especially China and India, but as they are sufficiently compensated 
through the transfer scheme, this no longer violates their interests.6
As an illustration, Figure 3 shows how the transfer schemes affect the stream of payoffs for 
China in a coalition of EU15 and China. Without transfers, the payoff for China is slightly 
negative for the first two decades, but is clearly positive for the later decades (as Chinese 
emissions are expected to stabilize), leading to a small but positive NPV of payoff (9 billion 
$). With the static transfer scheme, the payoff decreases rapidly and turns negative after two 
decades. This is due to the fast growth of reference emissions and thus the large need for 
emission reductions by China; in these periods, China buys permits from the EU15. In later 
decades, the payoff turns positive again, as Chinese emissions stabilize and China is able to 
sell some permits. In net present value terms, the coalition is not beneficial for China (NPV of 
payoff equals -5 billion $). Note that the stream of transfers can be read from the figure by 
subtracting the payoff without transfers from the payoff with transfers. 
Figure 3: Undiscounted payoff path for China in the coalition of EU15 and China 
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6 Note also that due to their low marginal abatement costs, China will reduce emissions substantially as a 
singleton as well; cf. panel (b). 
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 With the dynamic transfer scheme, China is able to sell permits to the EU15 in all periods, as 
the difference in growth rates between the two regions is taken into account in the allocation 
of the emission permits. Thus, the negative payoff in the middle of the century is prevented 
and China earns a NPV of almost 400 billion US$ on the sale of excess permits. These 
additional earnings overcome the free-rider incentives of China, and while they reduce the 
gains from cooperation for the EU15, the outcome is beneficial for both, and thus the coalition 
is internally stable. Larger coalitions will violate the interests of some members, because the 
emission permit price will be too high due to excess demand or too low due to excess supply. 
Thus, the coalition of EU15 and China is also externally stable. 
 
4. Alternative transfer schemes 
4.1. Population based permit trading 
We apply a different transfer scheme, using the data on population over our planning horizon 
from the EPPA model as reported by Babiker et al. (2001). In the static transfer scheme, we 
use population shares in 2010 to determine the shares of signatories in the emission permits 
trading scheme, while for the dynamic transfer scheme we use the entire path. For the 
population-based transfer schemes, only the sharing rule needs to be revised. In this case, the 
static transfer scheme shares are given by  
 ,2010
,2010
i
it i
i
i K
pop
pop
λ λ
∈
= = ∑  [16c]  
where 2010,ipop  denotes the regional population in 2010. The dynamic shares are calculated as 
 itit
it
i K
pop
pop
λ
∈
= ∑  [16d]  
The static population based permits imply that regions with large population in 2010 such as 
the Energy exporting countries, China, and India, will obtain more permits to sell and higher 
payoffs than in the absence of the tradable permits. However, other signatories will not be 
better off under the population based transfer scheme. For the dynamic transfer scheme, 
regions with high expected population growth will benefit from the dynamic transfer path; 
these include for example, Energy exporting countries, China and India. 
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 Under the population-based emission permit trading scheme, we find no stable coalitions, 
using either a static or dynamic transfer scheme. Table 5 reports the Grand Coalition. It is 
clear that the transfers involved are huge, especially for the USA and Energy exporting 
countries. 
Table 5: Grand Coalition (with population-based permit trading) 
Abatement in 2110 Net present value (NPV) of payoff 
Incentive to change 
membership (NPV) 
(% of BAU emissions) Billion US$ over 100 years Billion US$ over 100 years 
Regions 
efficient 
level 
assigned 
level for 
static 
transfers 
assigned 
level for 
dynamic 
transfers
no 
transfers
static 
transfers
dynamic 
transfers
no 
transfers 
static 
transfers 
dynamic 
transfers
USA 12 86 90 4,158 -11,233 -12,096 52 15,443 16,307 
JPN 11 60 80 3,930 2,117 1,567 -281 1,531 2,082 
EU15 12 61 79 5,062 -79 -1,665 -432 4,709 6,295 
OOE 14 72 80 518 -2,176 -2,495 261 2,955 3,274 
EET 29 51 71 -1 -634 -1,175 297 930 1,471 
FSU 21 55 65 1,031 -2,457 -2,977 423 3,911 4,430 
EEX 21 -241 -359 248 13,461 17,855 420 -12,793 -17,187 
CHN 54 -3 25 -1,777 5,248 2,096 2,727 -4,299 -1,147 
IND 29 -112 -95 482 9,038 8,317 588 -7,968 -7,247 
DAE 26 33 39 209 -272 -421 352 833 982 
BRA 5 -42 -24 333 907 690 27 -547 -330 
ROW 20 13 -50 1,019 1,291 5,513 442 171 -4,052 
Global 23 23 23 15,211 15,211 15,211 4,877 4,877 4,877 
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,304 Gton 
4.2. Emission-based surplus sharing 
Transfer schemes based on surplus sharing are proposed for instance by Weikard et al. (2006), 
who consider various sharing rules for the gains from cooperation. One of the main 
advantages of surplus sharing is that individual rationality is always satisfied as long as a 
coalition is at all profitable, i.e. countries cannot be worse off with the transfer scheme than 
without.  
The sharing rule assigns a share itλ of the coalition surplus KtS  (as defined below in equation 
17) to every coalition member  such that Ki∈ K Kit t itS sλ ⋅ =  ;  can also be called the claim of 
member i. The coalition surplus 
K
its
K
tS  is defined as the joint gain of the coalition members 
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 compared with their joint payoff in the benchmark situation of the All Singletons 
structure , i.e. )( Nitq
 ) . [17] (π)(π * Nt
Ki Ki
ittit
K
t qqS ∑ ∑
∈ ∈
−=
Then, the payoff of a coalition member is given by its benchmark payoff plus its share of the 
coalition surplus:  
 . [18] Kit
N
tit
K
it sq += )(ππˆ
Although it is possible to apply different rules to the sharing problem (such as equal sharing, 
proportional sharing and combinations), we adopt a proportional sharing rule, based on 
emission levels. Thus, this transfer scheme is the outcome-based analogue to our emission-
based (grandfathering) scheme in the context of permit trading. 
For the static transfer scheme, the shares are based on 2010 emission levels: 
 ,2010
,2010
iK K K
it it t i t t
i
i K
e Ks S S
e
λ λ
∈
= ⋅ = ⋅ = ⋅∑ S  [19a] 
For the dynamic transfer scheme, we use the full path of reference emissions without 
abatement to determine the time-dependent shares: 
 K K itit it t t
it
i K
e Ks S
e
λ
∈
= ⋅ = ⋅∑ S  [19b]  
Table 6 presents the main results of the emission-based surplus sharing scheme for the only 
stable coalition, USA and China. This coalition is stable under both the static and dynamic 
transfer scheme. When transfers are based on a division of the gains from cooperation rather 
than division of tradable emission permits, internal stability is less of a problem. Therefore, 
though the static transfer scheme is not entirely matching the development of the regions, the 
scheme is sufficient to stabilize this coalition. The incentives to change membership are for 
most regions more strongly negative under the dynamic transfer scheme, indicating that the 
dynamic transfer scheme is more robust than the static scheme. 
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 Table 6: Coalition of USA and China (with emission-based surplus sharing) 
Abat. in 
2110 Claim in 2110 
Net present value (NPV) of 
payoff 
Incentive to change 
membership (NPV) 
(% BAU) Million US$ Billion US$ over 100 years Billion US$ over 100 years Regions 
efficient 
level 
static 
transfers 
dynamic 
transfers 
no 
transfers
static 
transfers
dynamic 
transfers
no 
transfers 
static 
transfers 
dynamic 
transfers
USA 6 11,342 11,704 1,731 1,332 1,319 -613 -215 -201 
JPN 3 - - 1,454 1,454 1,454 312 -399 -421 
EU15 6 - - 1,940 1,940 1,940 541 -350 -388 
OOE 3 - - 290 290 290 -27 -45 -42 
EET 3 - - 110 110 110 -44 -5 -7 
FSU 5 - - 562 562 562 -19 -58 -78 
EEX 2 - - 253 253 253 -51 -15 -23 
CHN 27 7,249 6,887 37 436 449 261 -137 -151 
IND 5 - - 417 417 417 -63 -80 -64 
DAE 2 - - 210 210 210 -44 -25 -30 
BRA 0 - - 130 130 130 -1 -29 -30 
ROW 5 - - 566 566 566 -21 -79 -87 
Global 8 18,591 18,591 7,700 7,700 7,700 232 -1,437 -1,523 
Global stock of CO2 in 2110 = 1,425 Gton 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we incorporate a dynamic emission-based permit trading scheme to examine the 
stability of all possible climate coalitions in a cartel game. We argue that a dynamic transfer 
scheme, based on the full path of reference emissions, rather than based on a single 
(historical) base year, can overcome some of the major obstacles in international negotiations 
by incorporating the fast growth of emissions in developing countries in the division of 
emission permits. We investigate to what extent the dynamic transfer scheme can contribute 
to the stability of an international climate agreement, using our empirical model STACO-2.1. 
We find that under a static emission-based permit trading scheme, historically large emitters 
get a disproportionately large share of the permits that they can sell while fast-growing 
regions, such as China and India, need to buy emission permits. This leads to the counter-
intuitive situation that historically large emitters are permit-sellers, while the developing 
countries are permit-buyers. Given the relatively large benefits in regions like Japan and 
EU15, such transfers do not match the incentive structures of the coalition members, and such 
coalitions will not be stable. 
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 This situation is improved under the dynamic permit trading scheme. We then obtain two 
stable coalitions; EU15 and China, and Japan and India. China and India will be better off 
because those regions have more emission permits and can sell their permits to the respective 
partner. As the gains from cooperation for this partner are sufficiently large, they also have an 
incentive to stay in the coalition. Dynamic transfer schemes are much better aligned with the 
changing incentive structures of regions over time and may be a key determinant in 
persuading developing countries to sign an international climate agreement. It should be noted 
that these coalitions are small and fall considerably short of filling the gap between no 
agreement and the Grand Coalition. The Grand Coalition of all regions leads to substantially 
higher abatement efforts and obtains large gains from cooperation, as marginal abatement 
costs vary widely between regions. However, the Grand Coalition is not stable, irrespective of 
the transfer scheme. The free-rider incentives are huge in the case without transfers and too 
large to be overcome by a transfer scheme, be it static or dynamic. 
Alternative transfer schemes, such as population-based permit trading or emission-based 
surplus sharing, show that a dynamic transfer scheme will perform better than a static transfer 
scheme in terms of aligning regional incentives, but this does not automatically imply that 
larger stable coalitions will be found under the dynamic scheme: in the case of population-
based emission permits, the dynamic transfer scheme is insufficient to stabilize any coalition, 
while in the surplus sharing scheme a coalition of USA and China is stable under both the 
static and dynamic transfer scheme.  
For future research, we would like to investigate the possibilities of exclusive membership 
rules, technology transfers and one or more rounds of renegotiations. These mechanisms may 
contribute to the stability of climate coalitions, especially in combination with dynamic 
transfer schemes as discussed in this paper. 
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 Appendix 1: Global parameters 
Symbol Description Value Unit Source 
 
M  
 
Pre-industrial level of 
CO2 stock 590 Gton Nordhaus (1994) 
δ  natural annual removal rate of CO2 stock 0.00866 - Nordhaus (1994) 
ω  
airborne fraction of 
emissions remaining in 
the atmosphere 
0.64 - Nordhaus (1994) 
r  discount rate 0.02 - assumption 
iθ  
share of region i in 
global benefits 
see Appendix 2,  
column 3 
own calculation based on Fankhauser 
(1995)  
iα  
abatement cost 
parameter of region i 
see Appendix 2, 
 column 4 
own calculation based on Ellerman 
and Decaux (1998) 
iβ  
abatement cost 
parameter of region i 
see Appendix 2,  
column 5 
own calculation based on Ellerman and 
Decaux (1998) 
ς  technological progress 
parameter 0.005 - assumption 
Dγ  
scale parameter of 
damage and benefit 
function 
0.027 - Tol (1997) 
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 Appendix 2: Regional parameters in the benefit and abatement cost function 
Emission in 
2010 
Share of global 
benefits  
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
Parameter of 
abatement cost 
Regions 
Gton (share)    
USA 1.763 (0.238) 0.226 0.0005 0.0398 
JPN 0.344 (0.046) 0.173 0.0155 1.8160 
EU15 0.943 (0.127) 0.236 0.0024 0.1503 
OOE 0.360 (0.049) 0.035 0.0083 0 
EET 0.226 (0.030) 0.013 0.0079 0.0486 
FSU 0.774 (0.104) 0.068 0.0023 0.0042 
EEX 0.469 (0.063) 0.030 0.0032 0.3029 
CHN 1.127 (0.152) 0.062 0.00007 0.0239 
IND 0.344 (0.046) 0.050 0.0015 0.0787 
DAE 0.316 (0.043) 0.025 0.0047 0.3774 
BRA 0.122 (0.016) 0.015 0.5612 8.4974 
ROW 0.637 (0.086) 0.068 0.0021 0.0805 
World 7.425 ( )  1=∑ ( )θ 1i =∑      
iα iβiθ
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